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Keeping Schools Safe: Why Schools Should Have an 
Affirmative Duty to Protect Students from Harm by Other 
Students 
ALISON BETHEL* 
 [E]ducation is perhaps the most important function of 
state and local governments. . . . Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion.1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Cleveland, Ohio, November 2003: Three eighth-grade boys tie jump 
ropes around the legs and neck of a sixth-grade boy and drag him around 
the school’s stage during gym class.2  None of the three teachers on duty 
see the incident and the boy is left at the mercy of the bullies until they 
grow tired of torturing him.3  Monroe, Louisiana, October 2003: A four-
teen year-old boy enters his classroom and pulls out a gun, leaving with his 
teacher’s keys and a fellow classmate as hostage.4  He leads police on a 
high-speed chase, before surrendering near the Arkansas state line.5  Bos-
ton, Massachusetts, September 2003: A fight breaks out on an over-
crowded school bus - a twelve year-old stabs another twelve year-old in the 
chest.6  Minneapolis, Minnesota, September 2003:  A high school student 
shoots two fellow students during gym class, killing both.7  New Orleans, 
Louisiana, September 2003: Eight girls are arrested after one girl is stabbed 
  
 * J.D. Candidate, 2005, Franklin Pierce Law Center – Concord, NH; B.A., 2002, Brandeis Univer-
sity – Waltham, MA.  I would like to thank the following Pierce Law Review editors for their assis-
tance with this article: Rebecca Barry, Chuck Maier, Brian Moyer, and Mia Poliquin.  I would also like 
to thank the Pierce Law Review advisor, Professor Chris Johnson. 
 1. 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (“. . . it is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a princi-
pal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, 
and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child 
may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education”).  
 2. Ebony Reed & Janet Okoben, Schools Fail to Expel Crime; Hundreds of Assaults, Fights Occur 
in Cleveland Schools, Statistics Show, Plain Dealer (Cleveland, Ohio) A1 (Nov. 9, 2003). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Robbie Evans, Police Halt Armed Teen, The News-Star (Monroe, La.) A-1A (Oct. 30, 2003). 
 5. Id. 
 6. Megan Tench, Boy, 12, Charged in Bus Stabbing 7th-Grade Victim in Stable Condition, The 
Boston Globe B1 (Sept. 25, 2003). 
 7. James Walsh & Randy Furst, Cold Spring School Shooting; Both Teenagers are Described as 
Well-Liked, Star Tribune (Minneapolis, Minn.) 12A (Sept. 25, 2003). 
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during a fight at a high school.8  Littleton, Colorado, April 1999: fifteen 
people, students and teachers, are killed before the two responsible for the 
deaths, students at Columbine High School, take their own lives.9  
These are but a few of the many instances of school violence which fill 
newspapers throughout our country each day.  While the situation is not as 
grim as some news reporters make it out to be,10 school-violence is still all 
too common.11  During the 2002-03 school year sixteen students died as a 
result of school-associated violence, and scores of others were injured.12  
And while the number of homicides occurring at schools has decreased, the 
percentage of students who are victims of school bullies has increased.13  
In addition, students fear more for their safety at school, or traveling to and 
from school, than they do when they are away from school.14  
Federal statutes have attempted to make schools safer by providing 
grants to assist schools in becoming violence-free.15  Similarly, some states 
have passed “bullying laws,” which mandate procedures for school offi-
cials to follow when dealing with bullying.16  These statutes, however, do 
not provide adequate remedies for students who are harmed by their peers 
  
 8. Eight Girls Held, Three Sought in Stabbing; Cohen High Student is Cut in School Fight, Times-
Picayune (New Orleans, La.) Metro 1 (Sept. 10, 2003). 
 9. Mark Obmascik, Healing Begins Colorado, World Mourn Deaths at Columbine High, The 
Denver Post (Denver, Colo.) A-01 (Apr. 22, 1999). 
 10. Between July 1, 1998 and June 30, 2003 the number of homicides that occurred at schools 
decreased from thirty-three during the 1998-99 school year to fourteen during the 2001-02 school year.  
National Center for Education Statistics & Bureau of Justice Statistics, Indicators of School Crime and 
Safety: 2003, 54 http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2004/2004004.pdf (accessed Apr. 30, 2004) [hereinafter Indi-
cators of School Crime].  
 11. Although decreasing, school violence is a worldwide epidemic.  See e.g. Ian Johnston, The 
Stabbing to Death of 14-Year-Old Luke Walmsley Shocked the Country. So Why Weren’t the Police 
Surprised? Scotland on Sunday (Scotland) 14 (Nov. 9, 2003). 
 12. Indicators of School Crime, supra n. 10, at 2. (The deaths resulted from homicide, suicide, 
unintentional shootings on school-grounds, and legal intervention).  During the 2001-2002 school year, 
there were seventeen school-related violent deaths. National School Safety and Security Services, 
School Deaths, School Shootings and High-Profile Incidents of School Violence, http://www.schoolse-
curity.org/trends/ school_violence.html (accessed Apr. 30, 2004). 
 13. Indicators of School Crime, supra n. 10, at 16. The percentage of students indicating that they 
are bullied increased from five percent in 1999 to eight percent in 2001.  Id. 
 14. Id. at 36 (this report was consistent in 1999 and 2001); see also National Center for Education 
Statistics & Bureau of Justice Statistics, Percent of Students in Grades 9 Through 12 Who Reported 
Experience with Drugs and Violence on School Property, by Race/Ethnicity, Grade, and Sex: 1997, 
1999, and 2001, http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d02/tables/dt146.asp (accessed Apr. 30, 2004) (In 
2001, 6.6% of students reported that they felt too unsafe to go to school; in 1999, only 5.2% of students 
had reported the same.  In 2001, 8.9% of students reported that they were threatened or injured with a 
weapon on school property; in 1999, only 7.7% of students reported similar threats or injuries). 
 15. See e.g. 20 U.S.C. § 5965(a)(8) (2000) (schools receiving grant funds under the Safe Schools 
Act can choose to use the funds for violence prevention activities). 
 16. See e.g. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 10-222d (2003) (requiring regional and local school boards develop 
policies to address school bullying); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 193-F et seq. (2003) (pupil safety and 
violence prevention); W. Va. Code § 18-2C-3 (2003) (policy prohibiting bullying and harassment).  
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during the school day.17  The majority of courts that have addressed stu-
dent-on-student violence have declined to hold that compulsory education 
creates the type of special relationship needed to impose an affirmative 
duty on schools to protect students from harm by other students.18  While I 
agree that compulsory education laws do not restrain students’ freedom in 
the same manner as, for example, a jailor restrains a prisoner,19 compulsory 
education laws do restrict students’ freedom by requiring students to attend 
school, under the care of their teachers.20  When teachers or school officials 
reasonably believe that students are being harmed by their peers, they 
should be required to inform their superiors who in turn should inform the 
parents.  Teachers who know that one student is harming another student 
should have a duty to protect that student from harm.  Requiring school 
officials to protect students from actual harm would, at the very least, make 
schools feel safer to students,21 thereby creating school environments more 
conducive to learning.22 
This article argues that federal law should impose on school officials 
an affirmative, albeit limited, duty to protect students from harm by other 
students when school officials know, or reasonably should know, that stu-
dents are harming other students.  Part II of the article contains a brief his-
torical overview of the official liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as 
the current theories for holding state officials liable for harm caused by 
private actors.  Part III discusses some recent cases where parents of chil-
dren injured at school by other students have sued a school or school offi-
cial(s) under section 1983.  The decisions in these cases represent the ma-
  
 17. See 20 U.S.C. § 5812 (2000) (establishing national educational goals but no student remedies if 
goals are not accomplished); 20 U.S.C. §5961 (2000) (indicating that the purpose of the Safe Schools 
Act is to assist school systems in creating and maintaining drug-free and violence-free schools by the 
year 2000); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 10-222d (no requirement that bullying policies include remedies other 
than reporting). 
 18. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989) (holding that 
absent limited exceptions, the State does not have an affirmative duty to protect citizens from harm 
caused by private actors).  DeShaney will be discussed in detail in part II, infra.  See e.g. D.R. v. Middle 
Bucks Area Vocational Technical Sch., 972 F.2d 1364 (3d Cir. 1992) (holding that the typical school-
student relationship is not one of the recognized exceptions discussed in DeShaney); Maldonado v. 
Josey, 975 F.2d 727 (10th Cir.1992).   
 19. The following are examples of instances where courts have found that a special relationship 
exists between individuals and the state: Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (prisoners); Youngberg 
v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982) (involuntarily committed patients); City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 
463 U.S. 239 (1983) (persons injured while being apprehended by police); Spivey v. Elliott, 29 F.3d 
1522 (11th Cir. 1994) (students living at state operated residential schools), aff’d 41 F.3d 1497 (11th 
Cir. 1995).  
 20. See e.g. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 193:1 (2003) (requiring parents to send children between the 
ages of six and sixteen to school). 
 21. Indicators of School Crime, supra n. 10, at 36 (“[s]chool violence can make students fearful and 
affect their readiness and ability to learn”). 
 22. N.J. v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 350 (1985) (Powell & O’Connor, JJ., concurring) (“[w]ithout first . 
. .  maintaining order, teachers cannot begin to educate their students”). 
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jority view that schools do not have an affirmative duty under the Due 
Process Clause to protect students from harm by other students.23  Part IV 
discusses the minority view, which imposes a duty under certain circum-
stances.  Part V describes other remedies available to students who are 
harmed by other students, and discusses some state responses to school 
violence.  Part VI argues that courts should adopt the minority view and 
impose a limited duty on schools, thus requiring school officials to protect 
students when they are aware or have a reasonable belief that students are 
being harmed by other students.  The article concludes with the policy rea-
sons that support a limited duty, and the implications of imposing such a 
duty on schools. 
II.  HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees that 
the states will not “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law…”24  While this guarantee may protect individuals from 
“certain government actions,”25 it does not provide a remedy for the indi-
vidual whose rights are violated.  42 U.S.C. § 1983 was enacted to provide 
a means of redress for individuals harmed by state actors.26  To prove that a 
section 1983 violation occurred, a plaintiff must show: “1) that an act or 
omission deprived [the] Plaintiff of a right, privilege or immunity secured 
by the Constitution or laws of the U.S.; and 2) that the act or omission was 
done by a person acting under color of law.”27 
The Due Process Clause does not impose an affirmative duty of protec-
tion on the states, unless a state actor causes the harm.28  Consequently, 
section 1983 is generally not available to individuals who are injured by 
private actors, even when the state has notice of the potential for harm, or 
has notice that an actual harm is occurring.29  In DeShaney v. Winnebago 
  
 23. Many courts have imposed liability on schools when students have been injured by their teach-
ers or other school employees.  See Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 975 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1992); 
Canty v. Old Rochester Regl. Sch. Dist., 54 F.Supp.2d 66 (D. Mass. 1999); C.M. v. Southeast Delco 
Sch. Dist., 828 F.Supp. 1179 (E.D. Pa. 1993); Marquay v. Eno, 662 A.2d 272 (N.H. 1995).  
 24. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 25. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986) (examples of government actions that individuals 
are entitled to protection from include intentional destruction of property, stomach pumping, and exces-
sive corporal punishment). 
 26. Section 1983 states “[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, 
custom or usage, . . . subjects . . . any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, 
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured.”  42 
U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).  Damages are available to parties who can prove liability under § 1983. 
 27. Niziol v. Dist. Sch. Bd. of Pasco County, Fla., 240 F.Supp.2d 1194, 1203 (D. Fla. 2002). 
 28. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 197. 
 29. Id. at 195. 
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County Department of Social Services, the state social services office re-
ceived notice that Joshua DeShaney, a two-year-old child, was being 
abused by his father.30  The State allowed DeShaney to continue living 
with his father, even though social workers making visits to their home 
suspected child abuse.31  Ultimately, DeShaney’s father beat him into a 
coma.32  DeShaney’s mother sued the state under section 1983, alleging 
that the Department of Social Services deprived Joshua of his Fourteenth 
Amendment rights by permitting him to remain in his father’s custody 
when they suspected that Joshua was being abused by his father.33 
In rejecting DeShaney’s section 1983 claim, the Supreme Court first 
instructed that the Due Process Clause does not require the state to protect 
individuals from harm inflicted by private actors.34  The Court then noted 
two exceptions to that rule: the state-created danger exception and the spe-
cial relationship exception.35  Under the state-created danger exception, the 
state is liable for harm caused by private actors when the state either cre-
ates or enhances the danger that caused the harm.36  The Court held that 
this exception did not apply because the state’s failure to remove Joshua 
from his father’s custody did not create or enhance the harm that Joshua 
suffered.37   
The Court also held the special relationship exception inapplicable be-
cause the State did not restrict DeShaney’s “freedom to act on his own 
behalf.”38  The Court stated that a special relationship is formed 
when the State by the affirmative exercise of its power so restrains 
an individual’s liberty that it renders him unable to care for him-
self, and at the same time fails to provide for his basic human 
needs – e.g., food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and reasonable 
safety. . .  The affirmative duty to protect arises not from the 
State’s knowledge of the individual’s predicament or from its ex-
  
 30. Id. at 192. 
 31. Id. at 192-193. 
 32. Id. at 193. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 195. 
 35. Id. at 198-202. 
 36. Id. at 201.  Victims of school violence have attempted to use the state created danger exception 
to impose § 1983 liability on schools for harms caused by private actors and courts generally hold that 
this exception does not apply in the school setting.  See e.g. Johnson v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 38 
F.3d 198, 200-202 (5th Cir. 1994).  For additional analysis of the state created danger exception see 
Thomas J. Sullivan & Richard L. Bitter, Jr., Abused Children, Schools, and the Affirmative Duty to 
Protect: How the DeShaney Decision Cast Children into a Constitutional Void, 13 Geo. Mason U. Civ. 
Rights L.J. 243 (2003); Joseph M. Pellicciotti, “State-Created Danger,”or Similar Theory, as Basis for 
Civil Rights Action Under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983, 159 A.L.R. Fed. 37 (2000).   
 37. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201. 
 38. Id. at 200. 
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pressions of intent to help him, but from the limitation which it has 
imposed on his freedom to act on his own behalf. . . . [I]t is the 
State’s affirmative act of restraining the individuals’ freedom to act 
on his own behalf – through incarceration, institutionalization, or 
other similar restraint of personal liberty – which is the ‘depriva-
tion of liberty’ triggering the protections of the Due Process 
Clause, not its failure to act to protect his liberty interests against 
harms inflicted by other means.39 
Since DeShaney was not in state custody when harmed, his freedom 
was not then restrained by the state and the special relationship exception 
did not apply.40  Thus, the state was not liable for his injuries.41 
When a special relationship exists the state has an affirmative duty to 
protect individuals from harm, even if the individual causing the harm is a 
private actor.42  Thus far, courts have held that a special relationship exists 
only in certain situations, including in prisons,43 state-operated residential 
schools,44 and where patients have been committed involuntarily.45  As the 
following section illustrates, most courts have declined to hold that com-
pulsory education laws create the type of special relationship that, under 
DeShaney, would require the states to protect citizens from harm by private 
actors.46 
III.  MAJORITY VIEW:  NO DUTY 
Alleging violations of section1983, parents of children injured by other 
students have tried to hold schools and school officials liable.47  Post-
DeShaney, these parents have argued that, by requiring students to attend 
school, the state compulsory education laws create a special relationship 
between students and school officials, who act under color of state law.48  
Most courts, however, have rejected this argument, holding that compul-
sory education laws do not create a special relationship, and therefore, 
  
 39. Id. (citations omitted). 
 40. Id. at 201. 
 41. Id. at 203. 
 42. Id. at 200. 
 43. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103-104. 
 44. Spivey, 29 F.3d at 1525. 
 45. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 316.  
 46. See e.g. D.R., 972 F.2d at 1372. 
 47. See e.g. D.R., 972 F.2d 1364; Graham v. Indep. Sch. Dist., 22 F.3d 991 (10th Cir. 1994); Bosley 
v. Kearney R-1 Sch. Dist., 904 F.Supp. 1006 (W.D. Mo. 1995); Young v. Austin Indep. Sch. Dist., 885 
F.Supp. 972 (W.D. Tex. 1995) B.M.H. v. Sch. Bd. of the City of Chesapeake, Va., 833 F.Supp. 560 
(E.D. Va. 1993). 
 48. See e.g. D.R., 972 F.2d at 1367. 
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school officials have no affirmative duty to protect students from harm by 
other students.49 
In D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical School, D.R. al-
leged that she and a fellow student were physically, verbally, and sexually 
assaulted by several male students in a school bathroom.50  D.R. claimed 
that the male students forced her into the bathroom, which adjoined the 
classroom, on a regular basis (an average of two to four times per week for 
a period of four months) and argued that her teacher should have been in 
the classroom while the acts were occurring and heard, or should have 
heard, the assaults taking place.51  The district court held that Pennsylania’s 
compulsory education laws created a special relationship between the stu-
dents and the school officials, which in turn created an affirmative duty 
requiring school officials to protect plaintiffs from the injuries caused by 
their fellow students.52   
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s ruling, 
reasoning that although the state compulsory education laws mandate at-
tendance, parents, and not school officials, are still the students’ “primary 
caretakers.”53  Pennsylvania law permits parents to determine where their 
children will be educated.54  It also gives parents who enroll their children 
in public schools the right to withdraw their children from specific 
classes.55  Thus, according to the court, the state’s requirement that chil-
dren receive an education does not restrict students’ freedom to the extent 
that they are unable to meet their own basic needs.56  “Although these acts 
allegedly took place during the school day, the court found that “D.R. 
could, and did, leave the school building every day.”57  The state did noth-
ing to restrict her liberty after school hours and thus did not deny her 
  
 49. See e.g. Graham, 22 F.3d 991.  Prior to DeShaney, at least one court had held that compulsory 
education laws puts “students . . . in what may be viewed as functional custody of the school authori-
ties” and thereby created a custodial relationship that placed an affirmative duty on school officials to 
protect students from harm.  Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 856 F.2d 594, 601 (3d Cir. 1988), 
aff’d on other grounds, 882 F.2d 720 (3d Cir. 1989) (distinguishing DeShaney, where the harm was 
caused by a private actor, from these facts where the student was harmed by a public school official). 
 50. D.R., 972 F.2d at 1366. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 1367 (the district court dismissed the complaint because the allegations did not establish 
that the school had knowledge of the incidents to establish reckless indifference, as required under § 
1983). 
 53. Id. at 1371. 
 54. Id. (indicating that children can receive an education at a public or private school, or be home-
schooled). 
 55. Id. (citing Pa. Stat. Ann. tit 24, § 15-1546 (1962 & Supp. 1991) (religious instruction); 22 Pa. 
Code § 11.26 (1992) (non-school sponsored educational trips and tours); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 24, §13-
1329 (1962) (healthcare)).  
 56. Id. at 1372.  The court also noted that the state law granting teachers and principals in loco 
parentis status did not affect the parents’ status as primary caretakers.  Id. at 1371. 
 57. Id. at 1372. 
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meaningful access to sources of help.”58  Since the compulsory education 
laws did not create a special relationship, school officials had no affirma-
tive duty to protect D.R. from harm.59   
Similarly, in Dorothy J. v. Little Rock School District, the Eighth Cir-
cuit rejected the plaintiff’s argument that compulsory education laws cre-
ated a special relationship that would impose an affirmative duty on school 
officials.60  In Dorothy J., a “mentally retarded ward of the State” sexually 
assaulted and raped another student while in class at their high school.61  
Dorothy J., the mother of the student victim, sued the school district, alleg-
ing a violation of section 1983.62  Relying on cases from other circuits,63 
the Eighth Circuit held that compulsory education laws do not create the 
type of custodial relationship that imposes a duty to protect upon the 
State.64  “Public school attendance does not render a child’s guardians un-
able to care for the child’s basic needs.  In this regard, public schools are 
simply not analogous to prisons and mental institutions.”65  Thus, the 
Eighth Circuit held that compulsory education laws did not create a special 
relationship between students and the school.66 
Most recently, in Crispim v. Athanson, the United States District Court 
for the District of Connecticut held that public elementary school officials 
were not liable to a student who was repeatedly harassed by other students 
because compulsory education laws do not create a special relationship 
between students and the state.67  Crispim alleged that her son, an elemen-
tary school student, was harassed by other students both during and after 
school hours.68  Although school officials were notified and the children 
harassing Crispim’s son were identified, nothing was done to prevent the 
harassment from continuing during school hours.69  The harassment con-
tinued until Crispim removed her son from school and moved to a nearby 
town to enroll him in its public school system.70  Crispim sued several 
school officials, alleging violations of section 1983.71  The court noted that 
  
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 1376.  The court also discussed, and rejected, the state-created danger theory as an alter-
nate basis for liability.  Id. at 1373-1376.   
 60. 7 F.3d 729, 734 (8th Cir. 1993). 
 61. Id. at 731. 
 62. Id. 
 63. See J.O. v. Alton Community Unit Sch. Dist. 11, 909 F.2d 267, 272 (7th Cir. 1990); D.R., 972 
F.2d 1364, 1369-73; Maldonado, 975 F.2d at 731-733. 
 64. Id. at 732. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. 275 F.Supp.2d 240 (D. Conn. 2003). 
 68. Id. at 243. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 244. 
 71. Id. at 242-244. 
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a few courts have imposed a limited duty on school officials to protect 
students from certain harms, but declined to follow those cases.72  Follow-
ing the majority view, the court reasoned that since parents have the right 
to decide where their children will be educated, they remain the primary 
caretakers of their children.73  Because students remain able to provide for 
their own basic needs, compulsory education laws do not create a special 
relationship that would impose a duty on the school to protect students 
from harm.74 
Post-DeShaney, the majority of courts, reasoning that compulsory edu-
cation laws do not render students or their parents unable to care for the 
child’s basic needs, have held that schools have no affirmative duty to pro-
tect students from harm by other students.75  As the following section illus-
trates, however, a few courts have held that compulsory education laws do 
impose on schools a limited duty to protect students from harm by other 
students.  The limited duty imposed by these courts requires schools to 
protect students from “foreseeable risks of injury or loss of life”76 and from 
behavior that shocks the conscience.77 
IV.  MINORITY VIEW:  A LIMITED DUTY 
A few courts have imposed a limited duty on schools, requiring school 
officials to protect students from harm inflicted by other students.78  These 
courts reasoned that although parents remain the primary caretakers, 
schools should protect students who, because of compulsory education 
laws, are in the care and supervision of school officials during school-
hours.79  These courts have not made the duty absolute, but they recog-
nized that compulsory education laws do restrain the freedom of students 
and parents, and consequently mandate limited protection for students dur-
ing school-hours.80 
Pagano v. Massapequa Public Schools was the first case, post-
DeShaney, where a court held that school officials owe a duty of care to 
students required to attend school.81  In Pagano, the plaintiff, an elemen-
  
 72. Id. at 247 (citing Pagano v. Massapequa Pub. Schs., 714 F.Supp. 641, 643 (E.D.N.Y. 1989); 
Lichtler v. County of Orange, 813 F.Supp. 1054, 1056 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)). 
 73. Id. at 247. 
 74. Id.  
 75. See e.g. Dorothy J., 7 F.3d at 732. 
 76. Lichtler, 813 F.Supp. at 1056. 
 77. Hasenfus v. LaJeunesse, 175 F.3d 68, 73 (1st Cir. 1999). 
 78. See Hasenfus, 175 F.3d 68; Lichtler, 813 F.Supp. 1054; Pagano, 714 F.Supp. 641. 
 79. See e.g. Hasenfus, 175 F.3d at 72. 
 80. See Hasenfus, 175 F.3d 68; Lichtler, 813 F.Supp. 1054; Pagano, 714 F.Supp. 641. 
 81. 714 F.Supp. at 643. 
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tary student in the Massapequa, New York school district, was physically 
and verbally assaulted by fellow students.82  The Plaintiff alleged that 
school officials knew of the incidents and had assured the students’ parents 
that they would take steps to prevent future harassment.83  Since the school 
took no preventative steps, the plaintiff alleged that the school district vio-
lated his due process rights.84  The court agreed with the plaintiff’s argu-
ment that the school setting was similar to a foster-home situation, because 
“the victim and the perpetrator(s) were under the care of the school in its 
parens patriae capacity at the time the[] alleged incidents occurred.”85  The 
court stated: “[w]e consider elementary school students who are required to 
attend school, the truancy laws still being in effect, to be owed some duty 
of care by defendants.”86  Due to the school district’s “failure to take pre-
ventative action” the court denied the school district’s motion to dismiss.87 
Four years later, in Lichtler v. County of Orange, another New York 
court held that “[a] state imposing compulsory attendance upon school 
children must take reasonable steps to protect those required to attend from 
foreseeable risks of personal injury or death.”88  In Lichtler, students were 
injured when a tornado and windstorm struck the school.89  The school had 
failed to implement emergency procedures; Plaintiffs alleged a violation of 
section 1983, arguing that the state’s compulsory education laws and the 
Fourteenth Amendment required the school, and the state, to reasonably 
care for the children, which the school failed to do by not having proper 
emergency procedures.90  The court stated “[s]ince power implies respon-
sibility, where governmental agencies or entities utilize sovereign compul-
sion to exercise coercive powers, a correlative duty exists of due care to-
ward those subjected to such compulsion.”91  The court held that compul-
sory education laws sufficiently restrain students so as to impose a duty on 
the state to protect students from “foreseeable risks of personal injury or 
death.”92  
  
 82. Id. at 642.  
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 643. 
 86. Id. (italics in original) (leaving open the definition of “some duty”).  
 87. Id. 
 88. Lichtler, 813 F.Supp. at 1056. 
 89. Id. at 1055. 
 90. Id. (the plaintiff’s also argued that the County’s disaster planning was inadequate and violated 
the life, liberty and property of the children without due process). 
 91. Id. at 1056. 
 92. Id.; compare Lichtler, 813 F.Supp. at 1056 with Graham, 22 F.3d at 994 (holding “foreseeability 
cannot create an affirmative duty to protect when plaintiff remains unable to allege a custodial relation-
ship”). 
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The First Circuit has also imposed a limited duty on the state to protect 
students from behavior that is “conscience-shocking or outrageous.”93  In 
Hasenfus v. LaJeunesse, the parents of an eighth-grade girl who tried to 
hang herself in the school locker-room, sued the school alleging a violation 
of section 1983.94  The student had been reprimanded by her gym teacher 
for misconduct during physical education class and was told to return to 
the locker room, which was unsupervised. 95  Prior to this incident, the stu-
dent, a rape-victim, had received counseling from the school guidance 
counselor and the school nurse.96  The plaintiff’s compliant alleged that the 
gym teacher, who was married to the school nurse, “knew or should have 
known of the rape and should not have sent [the student] alone and unsu-
pervised away from the area he was monitoring when he knew or should 
reasonably have known that she was despondent or distressed.”97  In addi-
tion, in the three months before her suicide attempt, seven other students 
had attempted suicide, and several of the attempts had occurred at school 
or at school events.98  The plaintiff argued that compulsory education laws 
and in loco parentis status made the student-school relationship similar to 
the relationships that the state has with prisoners and involuntarily-
committed patients.99   
The court began by noting that the plaintiff’s argument had been re-
jected by the majority of courts that had addressed the issue.100  The court 
then stated: 
We are loath to conclude now and forever that inaction by a school 
toward a pupil could never give rise to a due process violation. 
From a common-sense vantage, [the student] is not just like a pris-
oner in custody who may be owed broad (but far from absolute) 
‘duty to protect.’ But neither is she just like the young child in De-
Shaney who was at home in his father’s custody and merely sub-
ject to visits by busy social workers who neglected to intervene.  
For limited purposes and for a portion of the day, students are en-
trusted by their parents to the control and supervision of teachers 
in situations where–at least as to very young children–they are 
manifestly unable to look after themselves.101 
  
 93. 175 F.3d at 73. 
 94. Id. at 69, 70.  
 95. Id.  
 96. Id. at 70.   
 97. Id. 
 98. Id.  
 99. Id. at 71. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 72 (emphasis added). 
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Ultimately, the First Circuit found that “in narrow circumstances there 
might be a ‘specific’ [constitutional] duty [to protect].”102 
The court then discussed instances when such a duty would arise, not-
ing that the circumstances would have to be extreme.103  Action,104 or inac-
tion, by school officials that “shocks the conscience” would violate the due 
process rights owed to students;105 to “shock[] the conscience,” conduct 
must be “truly outrageous, uncivilized, and intolerable.”106  The teacher’s 
conduct, even when combined with the knowledge that the plaintiff was a 
rape victim and that other students had attempted suicide, was not “truly 
outrageous, uncivilized or intolerable.”107  Since the conduct that occurred 
in Hasenfus was not conscience shocking, there was no due process viola-
tion and the section 1983 claim failed.108 
As these cases indicate, a few courts have held that compulsory educa-
tion laws impose a limited duty upon school officials to protect students 
from certain types of conduct.  While not creating the same type of special 
relationship that exists between prisoner and jailor, compulsory education 
laws do restrict the freedom of students and their parents, by mandating 
that children receive an education and attend school.109  For the duration of 
the school day, students must attend school and may not seek assistance 
  
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. The court stated “[w]here a state official acts so as to create or even markedly increase a risk, 
due process constraints may exist, even if inaction alone would raise no constitutional concern.”  Id. at 
73. 
 105. Id. at 72 (citing County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998)). 
 106. Id.  The court listed cases where they had found that state conduct shocked the conscience such 
that it violated the due process rights of the victim; the facts in those cases included: a police officer 
raping an individual during a traffic stop and a 57-day unlawful detention despite repeated requests for 
release.  Id. (citations omitted). 
 107. Id. at 73. 
 108. Id.  The court noted that the school may have been negligent, but that negligence does not rise to 
the level of a due process violation.  Id.  In Armijo v. Wagon Mound Pub. Schs., a sixteen-year-old 
special education student was suspended for violent behavior at school and was driven home by the 
school counselor.  159 F.3d 1253, 1256 (10th Cir. 1998).  The school failed to notify his parents that 
the student was taken home.  Id.  Before his parents arrived home, the student committed suicide.  Id.  
The court held that there was not a special relationship, but that the school might be liable if sending 
the student home alone increased the danger to the student and “shocked the conscience.”  Id. at 1261-
62. 
 109. See e.g. Ala. Code § 16-28-3 (2003) (requiring all children between the ages of seven and six-
teen to attend school); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 10-184 (2003) (requiring all children between the ages of five 
and eighteen to attend school unless the child is a high school graduate or has reached the age of six-
teen and with the parent’s consent has withdrawn from school); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 193:1 (requiring 
all children between the ages of six and sixteen to attend school); see also National Center for Educa-
tion Statistics & Bureau of Justice Statistics, Ages for Compulsory School Attendance, Special Educa-
tion Services for Students, Policies for Year-Round Schools and Kindergarten Programs, by state: 
1997 and 2000, http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d02/tables/dt150.asp (accessed Apr. 30, 2004) 
(indicating, for each state, the ages that children are required to attend school pursuant to the state 
compulsory education laws). 
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from their parents when victimized by their peers.110  Truancy laws further 
restrict students’ ability to seek assistance from their parents during the 
school day by imposing punishments on parents who violate the compul-
sory education laws.111  If a parent removes her child because of danger in 
the school, the parent could be subject to prosecution for violation of tru-
ancy laws.112  School officials should therefore be constitutionally required 
to protect students who are being harmed by other students, on school-
grounds, during the school day.   
V.  OTHER REMEDIES 
Currently most school districts are not liable under section 1983 when 
one student injures another student; however, state legislatures and tort law 
have provided remedies in limited situations.113   
Section 320 of the Second Restatement of Torts states: 
One who is required by law to take . . . custody of another under 
circumstances such as to deprive the other of his normal power of 
self-protection or to subject him to association with persons likely 
to harm him, is under a duty to exercise reasonable care so to con-
trol the conduct of third persons as to prevent them from intention-
ally harming the other or so conducting themselves as to create an 
unreasonable risk of harm to him, if the actor (a) knows or has rea-
son to know that he has the ability to control the conduct of the 
third persons, and (b) knows or should know of the necessity and 
opportunity for exercising such control.114 
A person is in custody when he is “deprive[d] . . . of his normal ability 
to defend himself, or . . . deprive[d] . . . of the protection of someone who, 
if present, would be under a duty to protect him, or though under no such 
duty would be likely to do so.”115  Consequently, section 320 applies to 
“teachers or other persons in charge of a public school”116 because students 
  
 110. See Hasenfus, 175 F.3d at 72. 
 111. See e.g. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 24, § 13-1333(a)(1) (2003) (a parent or guardian found guilty of 
failure to comply with compulsory education laws shall be sentenced to pay a fine and court costs, or to 
complete a parenting education program).  
 112. See id. 
 113. See Ala. Code § 16-1-24.1 (2003) (safe school policy); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 320 
(1965) (duty of person having custody of another to control conduct of third person); Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 314A illus. 7 (1965) (special relationships giving rise to a duty to protect include 
teacher-student relationships). 
 114. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 320 (2000). 
 115. Id. at cmt. b. 
 116. Id. at cmt. a. 
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are “deprived of the protection of [their] parents or guardians.”117  Com-
ment (d) to section 320 also requires people with custody of others to give 
them effective protection should the need arise.118  Comment (d) states: 
A schoolmaster who knows that a group of older boys are in the 
habit of bullying the younger pupils to an extent likely to do them 
actual harm, is not only required to interfere when he sees the bul-
lying going on, but also to be reasonably vigilant in his supervision 
of his pupils so as to ascertain when such conduct is about to oc-
cur. This is true whether the actor is or is not under a duty to take 
custody of the other.119 
Thus, tort law requires teachers to protect students from harm by other 
students.  Tort law also requires teachers to anticipate harms and intervene 
to prevent them from occurring.   
Courts have recognized this duty drawn from the Restatements when 
confronted with cases involving injured students who sue their school for 
negligence.120  Courts recognize that children must attend school and while 
there, the protection that they receive from their parents is “mandatorily 
substituted” with the protection that they should receive from their teach-
ers.121  In Mirand v. City of New York, a school was held liable for failing 
to protect a student who had informed a teacher that another student threat-
ened to kill her.122  The teacher did nothing to protect the student, who was 
attacked at the end of the school day.123  The court held that the school was 
liable because school officials had a “duty to adequately supervise the stu-
dents in their charge and they will be held liable for foreseeable injuries 
proximately related to the absence of adequate supervision.”124   
  
 117. Id. at cmt. b. 
 118. Id. at cmt. d. 
 119. Id. (italics added). 
 120. See e.g. Simmons v. Beauregard Parish Sch. Bd., 315 So.2d 883, 886-887 (La. App. 3d Cir. 
1975) (holding school liable when a thirteen-year-old student, under the supervision of the “school bus-
duty teachers,” was injured by an explosion that occurred when he demonstrated his model volcano to 
his friends); Eisel v. Bd. of Educ. of Montgomery County, 597 A.2d 447, 456 (Md. 1991) (imposing a 
duty on school counselors to “use reasonable means to attempt to prevent a suicide when they are on 
notice of a child or adolescent student’s suicidal intent”); Ferraro v. Bd. of Educ. of N.Y.C., 212 
N.Y.S.2d 615 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dept. 1961), aff’d 221 N.Y.S.2d 279 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dept. 1961) 
(school liable when one student harmed by another).  Compare Simmons, 315 So.2d at 886-87 with 
Guerrero v. South Bay Union Sch. Dist., 2003 WL 22928861 (Cal. App. Dec. 12, 2003) (no duty to 
supervise children properly dismissed from school while they are waiting for parents to arrive); Young 
v. Salt Lake City Sch. Dist., 52 P.3d 1230 (Utah 2002) (no duty of care owed to student who was in-
jured while riding a bicycle to a mandatory parent-student-teacher conference). 
 121. McLeod v. Grant County Sch. Dist. No. 128, 255 P.2d 360, 362 (Wash. 1953) (emphasis added). 
 122. 614 N.Y.S.2d 372 (N.Y. 1994). 
 123. Id. at 374. 
 124. Id. at 375. 
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A few courts have held that even colleges have a duty to protect stu-
dents from harm by third parties.125  This duty exists even though compul-
sory education laws do not require individuals to attend college.  In Peter-
son v. San Francisco Community College District, the Supreme Court of 
California held that a community college had to exercise due care to pro-
tect students from foreseeable harm.126  
In the closed environment of a school campus where students pay 
tuition . . ., where they spend a significant portion of their time and 
may in fact live, they can reasonably expect that the premises will 
be free from physical defects and that school authorities will also 
exercise reasonable care to keep the campus free from conditions 
which increase the risk of crime.127  
Similarly, the Third Circuit has imposed a tort-law duty on colleges 
who recruit student-athletes.128  
Duty, in any given situation, is predicated on the relationship exist-
ing between the parties at the relevant time . . . . [Therefore,] the 
College owed [the student] a duty of care in his capacity as an in-
tercollegiate athlete engaged in school-sponsored intercollegiate 
athletic activity for which he had been recruited.129 
While no one must attend college, these courts have been willing to 
impose a duty to protect students based on the relationship created once the 
students opted to attend. 
As these cases indicate, courts have been willing to impose tort-law 
duties on school officials to anticipate and protect students from harm in-
flicted by third parties.  These tort-law duties, however, do not create con-
stitutional protections,130 and lack the benefits that section 1983 provides 
for plaintiffs.131  In addition, in states that recognize a defense of sovereign 
immunity from tort action, injured students would be precluded from suing 
  
 125. Kleinknecht v. Gettysburg College, 989 F.2d 1360 (3d Cir. 1993); Peterson v. S.F. Community 
College, 685 P.2d 1193, 1201 (Ca. 1984). 
 126. 685 P.2d at 1201. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Kleinknecht, 989 F.2d 1360. 
 129. Id. at 1366-1369; compare Kleinknecht, 989 F.2d at 1366-1369 with Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 612 
F.2d 135, 141 (3d Cir. 1979) (holding that a college does not take custody of students by prohibiting all 
students under twenty-one from consuming alcoholic beverages, therefore no duty was owed to stu-
dents who chose to consume alcohol in violation of the regulation). 
 130. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976) (rejecting plaintiff’s argument that the Fourteenth 
Amendment should be read to protect individuals from injuries whenever states have acted negligently 
because it “would make of the Fourteenth Amendment a font of tort law to be superimposed upon 
whatever systems may already be administered by the States”). 
 131. For example, 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2000) permits the prevailing party in a § 1983 suit to recover 
costs and attorneys fees. 
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a school district for negligence.132  Thus, imposing section 1983 liability on 
school officials would be more beneficial to injured students than tort law 
remedies. 
State laws attempting to create safe school environments similarly fall 
short of benefits of section 1983.  Some state legislatures, in trying to cre-
ate a safer school environment, have responded to incidents of school vio-
lence by passing bullying laws.133  These statutes recognize the importance 
of safe schools and they generally require  
Any school employee, or employee of a company under contract 
with a school or school district, who has witnessed or has reliable 
information that a pupil has been subjected to insults, taunts, or 
challenges, whether verbal or physical in nature, which are likely 
to intimidate or provoke a violent or disorderly response  
to report the incident to the principal.134  School employees who report 
violations are then immune from any cause of action that might arise from 
a failure to remedy the incident.135   
The federal government has even created a website, Take a Stand, 
Lend a Hand, Stop Bullying Now, that provides resources for children and 
parents interested in preventing bullying.136  The website provides informa-
tion for children who are being bullied,137 who witness bullying,138 and 
who are bullying others.139  It also provides information for adults, includ-
  
 132. Gamble v. Ware County Bd. Of Educ., 561 S.E.2d 837, 842 (Ga. App. 2002) (plaintiff’s tort 
claims against board of education dismissed because Georgia’s limited waiver of sovereign immunity 
does not apply to school districts); Arteman v. Clinton Community Unit Sch. Dist., 763 N.E.2d 756, 760 
(Ill. 2002) (school boards and school districts immune from tort liability); Black’s Law Dictionary 753 
(Bryan A. Garner ed., 7th ed., West 1999) (“A state’s immunity from being sued in federal court by the 
state’s own citizens”).  This defense would not prohibit students from suing individual teachers for 
negligence, although in some states teachers who act on behalf of the school district within the scope of 
their employment are immune from liability.  See Tex. Educ. Code § 22.051(a) (2003). 
 133. See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 10-222d (policy on bullying behavior); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 193-F:3 
(2003) (requiring local school boards to adopt a pupil safety and violence prevention policy that ad-
dresses pupil harassment); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 24, § 13-1310-A (2003) (creating a safe schools advocate 
for each school district).  The Connecticut legislature passed the bullying law after a twelve-year old 
boy, who had been bullied on a daily basis by fellow students, committed suicide.  See 60 Minutes II, 
“Suicide of a 12-year-old” (CBS Oct. 29, 2003) (TV series). 
 134. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 193-F:3(II). 
 135. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 193-F:3(IV). 
 136. United States Department of Health and Human Services, Maternal and Child Health Bureau, 
Take a Stand, Lend a Hand, Stop Bullying Now, http://www.stopbullyingnow.hrsa.gov/index.asp (ac-
cessed Apr. 28, 2004) [hereinafter Stop Bullying Now]. 
 137. Stop Bullying Now, http://www.stopbullyingnow.hrsa.gov/index.asp?Area=areyou (accessed 
Apr. 28, 2004) (providing information for children who are being bullied by other children). 
 138. Stop Bullying Now, http://www.stopbullyingnow.hrsa.gov/index.asp?Area=witness (accessed 
Apr. 28, 2004) (providing information for children who witness bullying). 
 139. Stop Bullying Now, http://www.stopbullyingnow.hrsa.gov/index.asp?Area=others (accessed Apr. 
28, 2004) (providing information for children who bully others). 
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ing ways to recognize whether a child is being bullied or is a bully, and 
ways to stop bullying.140  This website, while an important step towards 
improving the safety of our schools, does not provide any remedies for 
children injured at school; thus, liability under section 1983 is still a neces-
sary and important remedy. 
Although there are some remedies available to students who are 
harmed by other students, they are not as adequate as a constitutional rem-
edy would be.  Unlike section 1983, tort law and the bullying statutes do 
not statutorily permit the prevailing party to recover attorney’s fees.141  In 
addition, not all states have passed bullying statutes, and tort law remedies 
vary from state to state.142  A limited Fourteenth Amendment duty, en-
forceable through section 1983, would benefit injured students, as well as 
non-injured students, by requiring school officials to protect students from 
harm that they know, or should know, is occurring.  Unlike tort law reme-
dies and state bullying laws, this federal constitutional requirement would 
be imposed on every school, in every state, creating safer learning envi-
ronments for all students. 
VI.  ARGUMENT IN FAVOR OF A LIMITED DUTY 
The importance of education and of a safe school environment is well 
documented in our nation’s jurisprudence.143  “[A]part from education, the 
school has the obligation to protect pupils from mistreatment by other chil-
dren, and also to protect teachers themselves from violence by the few 
students whose conduct in recent years has prompted national concern.”144  
Congress has expressly stated “education is fundamental to the develop-
ment of individual citizens and the progress of the Nation . . . the impor-
  
 140. Stop Bullying Now, http://www.stopbullyingnow.hrsa.gov/indexAdult.asp?Area=children 
whoarebullied (accessed Apr. 28, 2004) (providing information about recognizing when a child is being 
bullied); Stop Bullying Now, http://www.stopbullyingnow.hrsa.gov/indexAdult.asp?Area=children 
whobully (accessed Apr. 28, 2004) (providing information about recognizing when a child is a bully) 
(accessed Apr. 28,  2004); Stop Bullying Now, http://www.stopbullyingnow.hrsa.gov/ in-
dexAdult.asp?Area=howyoucanhelp (accessed Apr. 28, 2004) (providing information for adults inter-
ested in stopping bullying). 
 141. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (permits the prevailing party in a § 1983 suit to recover costs and attor-
neys fees); see e.g. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 10-222d (providing no remedies for victims of bullying). 
 142. Seventeen states currently have bullying laws.  Bully Police, http://bullypolice.org (accessed Jan. 
31, 2004). 
 143. See e.g. 20 U.S.C. § 3401(1) (2000) (“[e]ducation is fundamental to development of individual 
citizens and the progress of the Nation”); Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986) (“‘pub-
lic education must prepare pupils for citizenship’”) (citations omitted); T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 350 (Powell 
& O’Connor, JJ., concurring); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. at 493 (“education is perhaps the most 
important function of state and local governments”). 
 144. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 350 (Powell & O’Connor, JJ., concurring). 
File: Bethel (Macro) Created on:  6/1/2004 7:34:00 PM Last Printed: 6/28/2004 5:49:00 PM 
200 PIERCE LAW REVIEW Vol.  2, No. 2 
 
tance of education is increasing as new technologies . . . are considered 
[and] as society becomes more complex.”145  In addition, Congress enacted 
National Educational Goals to “promot[e] coherent, nationwide, systematic 
education reform [and] improv[e] the quality of learning and teaching in 
the classroom.”146  National Educational Goal seven indicates Congress’ 
recognition of the importance of safe schools, by striving for “safe, disci-
plined, ... drug-free school zones” throughout the country.147  Yet govern-
ment recognition of the importance of education and a safe school envi-
ronment is insufficient, as violence continues to occur in schools through-
out the country.148 
The special relationship exception to the Due Process Clause should 
encompass students who are compelled to attend school.149  Although 
compulsory education laws do not render parents unable to care for their 
children’s basic needs, they do restrain students’ freedom to act on their 
own behalf by requiring students to attend school.  The “nature [of the 
State’s power over schoolchildren] is custodial and tutelary, permitting a 
degree of supervision and control that could not be exercised over free 
adults.”150  Because compulsory education laws mandate attendance, “for a 
portion of the day, students are entrusted by their parents to the control and 
supervision of teachers.”151  School officials, therefore should be required 
to protect students whom they know, or should know, are being harmed by 
other students.   
This duty should not be absolute.  As under the bullying laws, students 
would have no recourse against school officials who were not aware, or 
could not reasonably have become aware, of the harm.  Nor should school 
officials who made a reasonable attempt to protect the student-victim be 
held liable for their inability to adequately protect the student,152 unless the 
  
 145. 20 U.S.C. §§ 3401(1), (6). 
 146. 20 U.S.C. §§ 5801(1)-(2) (2000). 
 147. 20 U.S.C. § 5812.  
 148. For examples of incidents of school violence, review supra notes 2-9 and accompanying text. 
 149. In Goss v. Lopez, the Supreme Court held that students have a protected interest in a public 
education that could not be taken away by suspension absent minimal procedural safeguards such as 
notice and hearing.  419 U.S. 565 (1975). 
Although [the states] may not be constitutionally obligated to establish and maintain a public school 
system, [they have] nevertheless done so and [have] required [their] children to attend.  Those young 
people do not ‘shed their constitutional rights at the schoolhouse door.’ ‘The Fourteenth Amendment, 
as now applied to the States, protects the citizen against the State itself and all of its creatures – Boards 
of Education not excepted.  Id. at 574 (citations omitted).   
 150. Vernonia Sch. Dist. v.  Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655 (1995).  The Court also states, in dicta, that it is 
not suggesting “that public schools as a general matter have such a degree of control over children as to 
give rise to a constitutional duty to protect.”  Id.  
 151. Hasenfus, 175 F.3d at 72. 
 152. See Pagano, 714 F.Supp. at 643 (single act of ordinary negligence may not form the basis of a 
civil rights claim). 
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teacher’s behavior is conscience shocking.153  Courts should only hold li-
able the school officials who are aware, or should reasonably be aware, 
that students are harming other students, as it is these officials who have 
failed to adequately protect students from danger.   
Although students’ freedom to act on their own behalf while at school 
is not as limited as a prisoner’s, compulsory education laws do require 
children to attend school and truancy laws do punish students who do not 
attend school as well as their parents.  These restrictions on freedom con-
stitute a sufficient restraint of personal liberty to justify finding a special 
relationship.  Furthermore, while at school, students are bound by school 
rules.  If harmed by other students, and school officials fail to protect them, 
then students have no other recourse until they return home at the end of 
the school day.  If a student chooses to leave school during the day, the 
child could be subject to truancy laws or punishment by the school for 
skipping class.  If a student is repeatedly victimized, and if the student’s 
parent cannot convince school officials to intervene, then the student is 
forced to withstand the harassment.  Contrary to the Third Circuit’s belief, 
in these situations, the state does deny the student and her parents “mean-
ingful access to sources of help.”154 
In instances such as this, the state can argue that compulsory education 
laws do not mandate where the student receives an education, only that the 
student receives one; therefore, the state does not restrain parents from 
enrolling their child in a different school.155  Not all parents, however, have 
the luxury of deciding where to educate their children.  In 2001, 15.1% of 
U.S. children between the ages of five and seventeen-years-old lived in 
poverty.156  In 1999-2000, the average cost of tuition for a private school 
  
 153. Hasenfus, 175 F.3d at 73. 
 154. D.R., 972 F.2d at 1372. 
 155. In some parts of the country, however, the state’s argument could fail due to desegregation 
plans.  In some areas, these plans require students to be bussed to specific schools based on the racial 
composition of the area schools.  See e.g. Drummond v. Acree, 409 U.S. 1228, 1231 (1972) (bus trans-
portation is a permissible method to achieve desegregation); Winston-Salem/Forsyth County Bd. of 
Educ. v. Scott, 404 U.S. 1221, 1229 (1971) (permitting school district to bus students to different 
schools to accomplish desegregation); McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U.S. 39, 41 (1971) (permitting school 
board to determine which school students attend based on the school’s racial composition).  Thus, 
parents would not be free to enroll their children in different public schools while the desegregation 
plans are in effect, as attendance at each school is determined by the desegregation plan.  See also Lee 
v. U.S., 849 F.Supp. 1474, 1502 (M.D. Ala. 1994) (denying a city’s request to operate as a school 
district separate from the county school district because the separate district would impede desegrega-
tion in the remainder of the county - county desegregation plan requires bussing to the city’s schools); 
cf. Bd. of Educ. of Okla. City v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 249-250 (1991) (permitting dissolution of deseg-
regation plan when the School Board complies in good faith with the desegregation decree and when 
the “vestiges of past discrimination ha[ve] been eliminated to the extent practicable”). 
 156. National Center for Education Statistics & Bureau of Justice Statistics, Household Income and 
Poverty Rates, by State: 1990 and 1999-2001, http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d02/tables/dt020.asp 
(accessed Apr. 28, 2004). 
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was $4,689 per year.157  The average cost for non-sectarian private schools 
during the same school year was $10,992.158  During the 1999-00 school 
year, 58,167,000 children were enrolled in public schools, while only 
9,504,000 children were enrolled in private schools.159  Many parents can-
not choose where their children receive an education.  If unable to afford 
alternate school settings, a student must attend the local public school.  In 
these types of situations, the state is affirmatively restraining the student’s 
freedom to act on her own behalf, and should therefore be required to af-
firmatively act to protect the student from harm. 
State statutes further restrict students’ freedom to act on their own be-
half, making the educational relationship even more similar to the prisoner-
jailor relationship.  Teachers are statutorily authorized to act in loco par-
entis in certain situations, including discipline160 and the provision of food 
to poor or undernourished children.161  Some state statutes explicitly grant 
teachers authority equivalent to a parent’s authority in those specific situa-
tions.162  States allowing corporal punishment permit teachers to use rea-
sonable force to discipline students or to protect themselves, without fear 
of being held liable for injuries to the student.163  Other states have enacted 
statutes specifically prohibiting corporal punishment, but permitting teach-
ers to use reasonable force to prevent students from harming themselves, 
others, or property.164  A few states also limit parents freedom to act on 
their child’s behalf through statutes that permit school officials to send 
students home for health reasons, even if the parent believes that the child 
can attend school.165  In addition to compulsory education laws and truancy 
laws, these statutes, which grant teachers authority over students and par-
ents, provide more evidence of the restraints that the state places on stu-
  
 157. National Center for Education Statistics & Bureau of Justice Statistics, Private Elementary and 
Secondary Enrollment and Schools, by Amount of Tuition, Level and Orientation of School: 1999-2000, 
http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d02/tables/dt061.asp (accessed Apr. 28, 2004). 
 158. Id. 
 159. National Center for Education Statistics & Bureau of Justice Statistics, Enrollment in Educa-
tional Institutions, by Level and Control of Institution: Fall 1980 to Fall 2005, http://nces.ed.gov/ 
programs/digest/d02/tables/dt002.asp (accessed Apr. 28, 2004). 
 160. See Ala. Code § 16-28-A-1 (2003); Ark. Code Ann. § 6-18-505 (2003).  
 161. See Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 24, § 13-1335 (2003); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 24, § 13-1337 (2003). Pennsyl-
vania also requires that children without food, shelter, or clothing be reported to relief agencies so that 
the children may attend schools.  Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 24, § 13-1334 (2003). 
 162. See Del. Code Ann. tit. 14, § 701(b) (2003); Ga. Code Ann. § 20-2-215 (2003); Pa. Stat. Ann. 
tit. 24, § 13-1317 (2003); see also T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 336 (majority) (“[t]eachers and school adminis-
trators, it is said, act in loco parentis in their dealings with students; their authority is that of the parent, 
not the State”). 
 163. See Ala. Code § 16-28A-1. 
 164. See Haw. Rev. Stat. § 302A-1141 (2003); Iowa Code § 280.21 (2003); N.D. Cent. Code § 15.1-
19-02 (2003). 
 165. See Ca. Educ. Code Ann. § 48213 (West 2004); Utah Code Ann. § 53A-11-802 (2003); Va. 
Code Ann. § 22.1-279.1 (2003). 
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dents’ freedom to act on their own behalf.  Taken together, these limita-
tions should be sufficient to create a special relationship between students 
and school officials that would enable injured students to sue school offi-
cials for violations of section 1983. 
A limited Fourteenth Amendment duty would permit victimized stu-
dents to recover damages under section 1983 when the student could show 
that the school officials were aware of the harm and did nothing to prevent 
it, or when students could show that the school officials’ behavior was 
conscience shocking.  Teachers must “’protect the very safety of students 
and school personnel’”166 because “government has a heightened obliga-
tion to safeguard students whom it compels to attend school.”167  This 
variation of the DeShaney special relationship exception would require 
school officials to act to protect students from harm and would therefore 
assist in ensuring that all children have the opportunity to receive the best 
education possible, in the safest environment possible. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In Brown v. Board of Education, the Court wrote, “education is per-
haps the most important function of state and local governments.”168  The 
existence of numerous state compulsory education laws and strict atten-
dance requirements supports this proposition.169  Children receiving an 
education must have the opportunity to learn in a safe environment, be-
cause “[w]ithout first establishing discipline and maintaining order, teach-
ers cannot begin to educate their students.”170  Many of the states that have 
chosen to enact bullying laws indicated that they did so because “a safe 
and civil environment in school is necessary for students to learn and 
achieve high academic standards.”171  Not all states have bullying laws, 
however, which permits teachers, should they choose to do so, to ignore 
bullying and ultimately leaves many student-victims to fend for them-
selves.   
School safety is best accomplished by placing an affirmative duty on 
school officials to protect students from harm.  School officials limit stu-
dents’ freedom to act on their own behalf by mandating attendance and 
  
 166. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 357 (Brennan & Marshall, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 167. Id. at 353 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
 168. Brown, 347 U.S. at 493. 
 169. See e.g. Ala. Code § 16-28-3. 
 170. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 350 (Powell & O’Connor, JJ., concurring). 
 171. W. Va. Code § 18-2C-1 (2003). 
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requiring students to conform their behavior to school rules.172  As such, 
school officials should be liable to students who are injured by other stu-
dents when school officials knew, or should have known, that the student 
was being injured, or about to be injured, and did not attempt to protect 
that  student.  Requiring school officials to protect students ensures that the 
parents are aware that their children are causing problems in school, and 
enables those who are responsible for the child - parents and teachers - to 
work together to prevent the child from acting out.  In addition, students 
will be able to learn more effectively in an environment where they do not 
fear their peers.173 
Tort law and the state bullying statutes are inadequate remedies for 
children who are victims of school violence.  It is only through a limited 
Fourteenth Amendment duty, arising from the restraint, placed by the 
states, on students’ freedom to act on their own behalf, that school officials 
will be affirmatively required to protect students from harm caused by 
other students.  During the school-day, “students are entrusted by their 
parents to the control and supervision of teachers” and are placed “in situa-
tions where . . . they are manifestly unable to look after themselves.”174  
Requiring those who are best suited to protect students during the school 
day to do so will assist states in achieving the safe schools that both they 
and the federal legislature strive for. 
 
  
 172. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200 (“it is the State’s affirmative act of restraining the individual’s 
freedom to act on his own behalf . . . which is the ‘deprivation of liberty’ triggering the protections of 
the Due Process Clause”). 
 173. Indicators of School Crime, supra n. 10, at 36; see also T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 350 (Powell & 
O’Connor, JJ., concurring) (“[w]ithout first . . .  maintaining order, teachers cannot begin to educate 
their students”). 
 174. Hasenfus, 175 F.3d at 72. 
